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As has often been remarked, it is seldom possible, in the study of our
common law, to take things by categories. Suretyship gives a good
example. Nothing in that branch of the law is better settled, nothing
less apparently open to influences from without, than the rule of indem-
nity, as between principal and surety. The principal, so runs the rule,
is bound to make good to the surety if the latter has been compelled to
pay the debt; the only condition being that he must pay the whole debt
instead of only part.' Such was the simple thought that was recog-
nized by the law merchant and by equity2 long before the courts of law,
through their use of the common counts, came to hear of it. If ever
a principle could be set off by itself and card-indexed as belonging to a
specific department of the law, without cross-reference to any other, it
would seem to be this.
But of equal step with the passage of this precept into its acceptance
by the common-law courts came other rules which were destined to
cross its path. Even in its simplest form of application the law of
suretyship was not to stand alone. And so the idea, that the surety is
entitled to reimbursement from his principal, has been intersected by
doctrines which belong to entirely different divisions of our legal sys-
tem. The result is that, properly to appraise the relation of principal
and surety, we must take into account developments in the statutes of
bankruptcy, in the law of judgments, and in the law concerning credi-
tors' rights. As a general proposition it remains true that the surety
can have the reimbursement to which natural justice entitles him; but
not always is this so, and, to know the when and why of the matter, we
must go as far afield as the subjects just mentioned, however remote
they apparently may be.
Let us start with bankruptcy. That system, as we know it today, has
two outstanding features, the administration of the debtor's estate, and
his discharge.
Under the law of today, there are two methods of obtaining a dis-
'See i Brandt, Suretyship (3d ed. 1905) sec. 338; McGrath v. Carnegie Trst
Co. (1917) 221 N. Y. 92, 116 N. E. 787; Pa. Society, etc. v. Philadelphia Co.
(1920, C. C. A. 3d) 266 Fed. I, 5.
2 "By the custom of the city of London" the surety was entitled to such relief.
Layer v. Nelson (1687, Ch.) i Vern. 456. As to the enforcement of this right in
equity, see Ames, Lectures on Legal History (1913) 149, 155-6.
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charge. Originally, as provided by the statute of Anne8 and by our
first national Act of i8oo, the court could not grant a discharge unless
the bankrupt presented a favorable certificate, signed by a certain pro-
portion of his creditors. The present statutes of both England and this
country dispense with the certificate, and require a discharge unless the
bankrupt has committed specified offences 4 ; but the effect is the same;
the bankrupt, if he gets his discharge, departs but leaves his estate injudicial custody. The other method of discharge is afforded by the
composition in bankruptcy, by which the bankrupt offers to bring into
court assets in place of those belonging to his estate. His tender not
only must be accepted by a majority of the creditors, but must receive
the court's approval. This will be withheld unless the proposition is
more attractive than the alternative of liquidating the estate on hand ;5
but, if the court approves the scheme, the bankrupt stands discharged.6
And thus, by either method of discharge, the debtor leaves behind him
something which his creditors may have, but goes free of all debts
entitled to share in the distribution of the estate left in the hands of the
court; the proviso which our present statute (sec. 17) makes in favor
of certain claims, as being provable but not barred by discharge, being
immaterial to this discussion.
Of the two prominent features of bankruptcy, the debtor's discharge
was the more complete innovation. There was nothing new in the idea
of administration, because equity had developed a liquidating juris-
diction of its own. This jurisdiction, indeed, which originated with
the estates of decedents, is still of force, in its original form, in Eng-
land and in some of our states; and, in this country, it has been
extended so as to include insolvent corporations and limited partner-
ships. 7 But the discharge of the debtor without the consent in pais
of the creditor was a very different thing. It could not be effected by
equity, because the chancery ideas of liquidation were concerned only
3Statutes (1705) 4 Anne, c. 17, sec. ip; (17o6) 5 Anne, c. 22; (1718) 5 Geo. 1,
c. 24, sec. 16; (1732) 5 Geo. II, c. 30, sec. IO; (1825) 6 Geo. IV, c. 6, secs.
I3, 122
' National Bankrupt Act 1898, Act of July I (30 Stat. at L. 544, 550) sec. 14 b;
English Bankrupt Act 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. V, c. 59, sec. 27. As Hough, J., has
remarked, a debtor comes out better with an absolute right to a discharge, in the
absence of proof of offence, than he did in the days when his discharge was
primarily dependent on a vote of the creditors. In re Kaufman (1917, C. C. A.
2d) 239 Fed. 305, 306.
'See I re Wayne Realty Co. (i92i, N. D. Ohio) 275 Fed. 955.
"English Bankrupt Act 1914, sec. 28; Nat. Bankr. Act 1898, sec. 14 c; Cun-
berland Glass Co. v. DeWitt (0915) 237 U. S. 447, 35 Sup. Ct. 636; It re Ameri-
can Paper Co. (igig, D. N. J.) 255 Fed. i2I; Ex parte Jacobs (1875) L. IL
I0 Ch. App. 2ii. The same thing is provided by many state laws, e. g., New York
Debtor & Creditor Law, sec. 230; Matter of Samnra (I95) 169 App. Div. 6o4,
x55 N. Y. Supp. 4H.
Glenn, Creditors' Rights (1915) ch. I6.
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with the fund in the hands of the liquidator. It could be done by an
informal composition, but that operated as a matter of contract as dis-
tinct from law, and the discharge of the debtor, therefore, was a thing
of release rather than of statute.8 But, so far is it from the conception
of lawyers and judges that a living debtor could be discharged in a
liquidation without a composition to which all the creditors should
assent, that a general assignment was considered as void, as against any
objecting creditor, if it required him to release the debtor as a condition
of participating in the distribution.9 It is, therefore, no matter of
wonder that early bankruptcy legislation did not prdvide for the dis-
charge of the debtor. That, indeed, was the state of things up to the
beginning of the eighteenth century. The debtor's discharge was riot
an integral feature of bankruptcy as it was conceived in the basic statute
of Elizabeth; nor was anything of the sort added by amendment until
the time of Queen Anne. As a natural consequence, the bankrupt's
discharge has not the slightest effect on the estate in the hands of the
court, or on the right of his creditors to share in it.1o
The discharge, once obtained under such a statute, has two aspects,
interesting in their diversity and yet consistent. From one point of
view it operates, as one might so put it, as matter of law; in quite as
important, if a different, direction, it has no such effect.
First of all, whether it be obtained through statutory composition or
the older form of procedure, it does not result from any voluntary act
of the creditor. And in this it differs from the informal compositions
in which bankruptcies so often had terminated prior to the composi-
tion being made a part of the procedure in the court itself. In the
instance of an informal composition the debtor's escape came from the
unanimous act of his creditors in releasing his debts by deed in pais.
But the statutory discharge through composition receives its sanction
from the law, and not from the creditors. Their vote sets the law in
motion; but it is the statute which discharges the bankrupt of his debts,
and not their act. 1
Nevertheless, the statutory nature of the discharge is not reflected in
its operation. That bankruptcy proceedings are in ren is true only as
concerns the administration of the estate. 2 A discharge is quite a dif-
'Phelps v. Borland (1886) IO3 N. Y. 406, 9 N. E. 307; Brozwne v. Carr (1831,
C. P.) 7 Bing. 5o8.
'Grover v. Wakenun (1834, N. Y.) ii Wend. 187.
" This is true whether he is discharged in the old way [In re Lighthall (915,
N. D. N. Y.) 221 Fed. 791] or through composition. . United States v. Sondheim
(igo, D. Mass.) 188 Fed. 378; In re Cadenas (igio, S. D. N. Y.) 178 Fed. 158.
Browne v. Carr, supra note 8.
' In the older cases, it is true, we find language like this: "But the proceedings
were so far in rein that actual notice to the creditors is not essential to the juris-
diction of the court; nor will the want of it invalidate the discharge." Ray v.
Lapham (1875) 27 Ohio St. 452, 458. But recent decisions have clearly estab-
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ferent thing. It is a personal defence, and must be pleaded to be
available.1 3 If not seasonably pleaded, it cannot later be used to invali-
date the adverse judgment entailed by this neglect; for the principle of
res judicata is of higher value than any concept that can be afforded by
a release, even though it should flow from a statute rather than the seal
of the creditor. That is why the bankruptcy court is not interested in
the debtor after his discharge.1 4 Indeed, while it is true that the court,
during the pendency of the bankruptcy proceedings, can protect the
debtor from suits against him, and from arrest on civil process on
provable debts, yet the sole purpose even of this is to protect the estate,
and therefore judicial action in that behalf'is wholly discretionary.-5
If, then, the principal is discharged in bankruptcy, this does not
destroy the debt which the surety has underwritten, and hence the
surety's liability should continue. In this the courts-agreed even before
statutes came expressly to provide to that end.' 6 A bankruptcy dis-
charge does not destroy the debt; it only gives the bankrupt the benefit
of a plea in bar, but a plea which does not deny the continued existence
lished that language used about bankruptcy proceedings being in ren must be
confined to decrees and orders affecting the distribution -of the assets. "The
adjudication is, for the purpose of administering the debtors' property, that is,
in its legislative effect, conclusive upon all the world," but in no other respect is
this true. Gratiot Bank v. Johnson (I919) 249 U. S. 246, 39 Sup. Ct. 263; Pell
v. McCabe (1919) 250 U. S. 573, 40 Sup. Ct. 43. See also NoTEs (1919) 19
COL. L. REv. 313.
"Moyer v. Dewey (88o) 103 U. S. 301; Friend v. Talcott (1913) 228 U. S.
27, 33 Sup. Ct. 505. Upon this rests the doctrine which allows the so-called
"revival" of a debt against which the debtor has been discharged in bankruptcy.
The new promise does not revive the debt; it simply waives the personal defence
of the discharge; and hence the creditor should declare on the old debt, reserv-
ing the new promise to establish by way of replication to the anticipated plea of
the discharge. Moyer v. Dewey, stepra. A discharge in composition has exactly
the same effect; and hence the new promise can revive a debt barred by that sort
of discharge. Zavelo v. Reeves (1913) 227 U. S. 625, 33 Sup. Ct 365; Herrington
v. Davitt (1917) 22o N. Y. 162, 115 N. E. 476.
"See Dimock v. Copper Co. (1886) 117 U. S. 559, 6 Sup. Ct 855.
" See Bankrupt Act, sec. 9 (30 Stat. at L. 544, 549) ; Ex parte Harrison (I92I,
D. Mass.) 272 Fed. 543; In re Federal Biscuit Co. (1913, C. C. A. 2d) 21o
Fed. 37, (I914, C. C. A. 2d) 214 Fed. 221; In re Maaget (19o9, S. D. N. Y.) 173
Fed. 232; In re Weisberg (igi8, E. D. Mich.) 253 Fed. 833; Peck v. Jenness
(1849, U. S.) 7 How. 612.
1' See Thayer v. Daniels (1872) 1io Mass. 345; Mason v. Bancroft (1876,
N. Y.) i Abb. N. C. 415. The present bankrupt acts of both England and this
country expressly so provide, whether the discharge be effected by composition or
otherwise. Nat. Bankr. Act 1898, secs. 12, 16 (30 Stat at L. 544, 55o) ; English
Bankrupt Act 1914, secs. 28, 16. The same proposition applies to compositions
under the Bankrupt Act; the surety not being discharged. In re American
Paper Co. (1919, D. N. J.) 255 Fed. 121; 'Easton Co. v. Canminez (1911) 146
App. Div. 436, 131 N. Y. Supp. 157; Guild v. Butler (1877) 122 Mass. 498; Cilley
v. Colby (i88i) 61 N. H. 63. As to state laws, see supra note 6.
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of the debt; hence the very wording of the plea, when made by the prin-
cipal, excludes repetition by the surety. The distinction is best shown,
it is believed, by the difference between the case where a bankruptcy
has terminated through an informal composition in which all the cred-
itors join, and the case of a statutory composition in the course of the
bankruptcy. In the first case the composition constitutes a defence for
the surety as well as his principal, because each creditor has actually
released his claim to the debtor1 7 ; but in the other case the creditors
have released nothing.18 Such, then, is the first intersection of bank-
ruptcy law with our rule of suretyship.
Not far beyond this crossing we meet another doctrine. This one has
nothing in common with bankruptcy, and is more fundamental because
it starts from no statutory source. If the discharge of the debtor in
bankruptcy is not available to the surety, how may the creditor be
secured in his enjoyment of the proposition? If the surety's agreement
has taken the form of a guaranty, whether it be of collection or of pay-
ment, the situation is easy, because the creditor, by virtue of the con-
tract, goes against the surety only for what he has failed to get out of
the debtor; and therefore the debtor's discharge gives the creditor
recourse against the guarantor on the separate contract thus consti-
tuted.1 9 But if the surety has bound himself to the creditor jointly
with the principal, the latter's discharge presents a problem. Common-
law courts were bound to respect the bankrupt's discharge, for it was
an act of the law which governed them in their doings. And so,
although the court of bankruptcy had no power to stay suits pending
against the bankrupt after the discharge was obtained,20 it was the duty
of common-law courts to admit the discharge by way of plea in bar, or,
if the suit meanwhile had gone to judgment, perpetually to stay the
issuance of execution.21 But this sort of thing complicated matters in
"TPhelps v. Borland, supra note 8; Cargoe v. Jones (1873) L. R. 8 Exch. 81;
Webb v. Hewitt (1857, Ch.) 3 Kay & Johns. 438. To same effect if creditor, by
agreement with bankruptcy trustee, binds himself not to prove against the estate
of principal. Re Wohnershausen (189o, Ch.) 62 L. T. R. 541.
18 Cases cited supra note 6.
This under the most exacting rule. Craig v. Parkis (1869) 4o N. Y. 181.
For the more moderate rule see Brackett v. Rich (1877) 23 Minn. 485, and cases
there cited.
'°Hellinan v. Goldstone (19o8, C. C. A. 3d) 16I Fed. 913; In re Lockwood
(1917, E. D. N. Y.) 24o Fed. 161; In re Rosenthal (igoi, S. D. N. Y.) io8 Fed.
368; It re Weisberg, supra note 15.
' Refusal of a state court so to do is reversible error cognizable in the Supreme
Court, the case involving rights conferred by a federal statute. Hill v. Harding
(1883) 7O7 U. S. 631, 2 Sup. Ct. 4o4; Boynton v. Ball (1887) 121 U. S. 457, 7
Sup. Ct. 981. Beyond granting a perpetual stay, however, a state court cannot
go in the absence of laws of its own jurisdiction; but many states have statutes
requiring the cancellation of such judgments. See Walker v. Muir (1909) 194
N. Y. 420, 87 N. E. 68o; Rukeyser v. Tostevin (1919) 188 App. Div. 629, 77 N. Y.
SURETY'S RIGHT TO INDEMNITY
the case of a joint obligation. The principal's discharge would, strictly
speaking, bar the entry of judgment against him; but, if no judgment
could go against him, neither could it go against the surety, and thus
against the latter the creditor would be deprived of recourse despite
the fact that the principal's discharge did not release the surety. This
would have presented a case for equity had not the courts discovered
that they possessed a certain flexibility in the enforcement of their
judgments, however automatic their course was up to. the moment of
judgment. Their discovery had been demonstrated in suits against an
executor; if his plea of plene adninistravit prevailed, the judgment
was "of assets quando acciderint." To other cases also had the courts
applied their latent capacity to do justice22 and, therefore, when the
question arose of which we have taken note, the common-law courts in
most jurisdictions found that they could handle the matter without
remission to equity. What they did was to enter judgment against
both parties, but immediately to stay execution against the principal.23
Thus the creditor got his due, with no detriment to the principal's
rights under his bankruptcy discharge.
The entry of any such judgment naturally makes the surety consider
the means he may use to get reiimbursed. It of course may happen that
Supp. 29i; Hershman v. The Justices (1915) 22o Mass. 137, lO7 N. E. 543;
Barry v. N. Y. Holding Co. (1918) 229 Mass. 308, 118 N. E. 639.
"' "But the common liw adjudications show that the judgment may be moulded
so as to conform to the rights of the parties under the law, and by analogy
support the view we take. Thus, in Peck v. Jenness, 7 How. 612, where the
plaintiff attached goods of his debtor before the latter was proceeded against in
bankruptcy, and where, pending the action, the debtor was discharged, the
supreme court of the United States held that it was competent and proper for
the court to render a judgment, notwithstanding the discharge, for the amount
of the debt, damages, and costs, 'to be levied only of the goods of the defendant
attached on plaintiff's writ, and not otherwise.' 'The books,' says Mr. Justice
,Grier, in this case, 'are full of precedents for such judgment. When an adminis-
trator pleads plene administravit, the plaintiff may admit the plea, and take judg-
ment of assets, quando acciderint. When the defendant pleads a discharge of
his person under an insolvent law, the plaintiff may confess the plea, and have
judgment, to be levied only of defendant's future effects.' (7 How. 623.) So,
subsequently, the supreme court held that when contracts made payable in coin
are sued upon, judgments may be entered for coined dollars, and parts of dollars
(Bronson v. Rodes, 7 Wall. 229). Upon the whole, our judgment is that the
action is well brought against the county; that the county may make defense,
but, if the plaintiff shall be found entitled to recover, he may.have judgment
against the county for his debts, damages and costs to be enforced, if necessary,
by iandaimus against the county court, or the judges thereof, to compel them to
levy and collect a special tax according to the statute in such case provided, and
not otherwise." Dillon, J., in ordon v. Cass County (1874, C. C. W. D. Mo.) 3
Dill. 185, 194: approved in County of Cass v. Johnston (1877) 95 U. S. 360, 370;
see also Fuller v. Aylesworth (1896, C. C. A. 6th) 75 Fed. 694.
"Hill v. Harding (z889) 130 U. S. 699, 9 Sup. Ct. 725; Wolf v. Stix (1878) 99
U. S. I; U. S. Engine Co. v. North Penn. Iron Co. (191o) 227 Pa. 262, 75 Atl.
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he has been forehanded enough to take security from his principal as a
condition of going surety at the outset; in that event, provided the
security is adequate, the surety need not be disturbed by the principal's
bankruptcy. The court which is administering the estate cannot
deprive the surety of his collateral, so long as there is a chance that he
may be called upon to pay the creditor. If the nature of the obliga-
tion assumed is such that the principal's bankruptcy-not his dis-
charge, but his bankruptcy, and of this more will be said hereafter-
terminates the surety's liability, naturally he must hand over the
collateral to the principal's estate; but in all other cases he may retain
it, being accountable to the estate only for the surplus value of it.24
But in the more usual case the surety has no collateral; and this, too,
even in the present day, when suretyship for hire has so largely dis-
placed the original idea of the surety being an accommodating friend
as to give rise to an exception to the older view of the law regarding
the surety's situation.2 5 Having no security, where can the surety go
for reimbursement after he has paid the creditor?
His first thought naturally would be of recourse upon the principal.
But the latter's discharge protects him, with a few exceptions not neces-
sary here to note, against all claims that may be proven against the
estate which he has left behind him in the bankruptcy court; and this
turns the surety to the inquiry whether he can prove against his princi-
pal's estate. What sort of claim can he prove? Bankruptcy statutes
provide a time limit for the proof of claims, a limit which is rigidly
enforced 26 ; and so it is important for the surety to know whether his
claim against the principal's estate can arise prior to his actually paying
the creditor, as perchance the latter may be dilatory in pressing for his
1o94; In re Mercedes Import Co. (19o8, C. C. A. 2d) 166 Fed. 427; Butterick
Pub. Co. v. Bowen Co. (1911) 33 R. I. 40, 8o Atl. 277; Schunack v. Art Metal Co.
(1911) 84 Conn. 331, 8o Atl. 29o.
'it re Federal Biscuit Co. (1914, C. C. A. 2d) 214 Fed. 221; In re Mercedes
Import Co., supra note 23; In re O'Donnell (1904, D. Mass.) 131 Fed. 15o.
In Farminig Co. v. Brannon (192o, C. C. A. 6th) 263 Fed. 891, the court held that
a surety, secured by indemnity which consisted of abond and mortgage given by
the debtor, cannot prove on the bond, but is limited to proving on the debt as paid -
by him. This, however, involves nothing peculiar to suretyship law.
"It is urged that the rule of strict construction generally applicable to the
obligation of sureties' should be here applied. But this is not that ordinary con-
tract of voluntary suretyship, as to which there has arisen a sort of tenderness
towards sureties. This is a contract of insurance, entered into by the surety for
the revenue which it derives from the business of suretyship, and in this relation
the obligation should be treated as other insurance contracts, which are usually
construed most strongly against the insurer." National Surety Co. v. McCormick
(1920, C. C. A. 7th) 268 Fed. 185, 188; Guaranty Co. v. Pressed Brick Co. (1903)-
191 U. S. 416, 24 Sup. Ct 142; St. Johns College v. Aetna Co. (1911) 201 N. Y.
335, 342, 94 N. E. 994, 996.
" See cases cited infra note 33.
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money. This, being a practical problem, went to the courts for solu-
tion; and, although we find the Supreme Court on one occasion declin-
ing its aid in this regard,2 7 eventually a rule was evolved which now
governs us. Before stating that rule let us consider its origin. -
A claim cannot be proven as of a certain date unless it is of the class
which the statute contemplates as fitted to share in the assets of the
estate. And, in determining the nature of a claim in this regard, the
original test was whether it had so matured that assumpsit would have
lain if the bankruptcy had not occurred. English legislation of modern
times has destroyed this test by its broad inclusion of contingent claims.
Our national legislation, on the contrary, has been fitful. The bank-
ruptcy acts of 1841 and of 1867 allowed the proof of contingent claims;
but our present law does not; the most that it does is to, make the bank-
ruptcy accelerate certain kinds of claims. 8
Under such a statute as we now have, let us take the case of matured
claims. It is obvious that, in advance of paying the creditor, the surety
has no right to prove in the bankruptcy; for he can bring assumpsit
only for reimbursement, not protection.2 9  In order to prove a claim
against the estate, therefore, the surety must pay the creditor within the
time limit allowed for claims; and this even though he must hunt up
the creditor for that purpose. But pursuing a creditor in order to pay
him is an idea more sternly just than it is alluring, and the surety may
prefer not to do so. In that event he is barred from sharing in his
principal's estate. But, if later the creditor should become active
enough to extort payment from the surety, can the latter then hold the
principal despite the discharge? Undoubtedly, if we are to consider
only the fact that the creditor has not been paid, because that leaves the
surety without a provable claim in the principal's bankruptcy, and so
leaves him with a claim against which the principal's discharge con-
stitutes no bar. There is no inherent vice in this reasoning, and the
courts which have yielded to it"° have much in their favor. But never-
" "If the sureties should ultimately pay the amount of any such judgment, and
thereby acquire a claim to be reimbursed by their principal the amount so paid
(which is a point not now in issue), it would be because his liability to them upon
such a claim did not exist at the time of the commencement of the proceedings
in bankruptcy, and therefore could not be proved in bankruptcy nor barred by the
discharge, and consequently would not be affected by any provision of the Bank-
rupt Act." Hill v. Harding (1889) 130 U. S. 6_9, 704, 9 Sup. Ct. 725, 726.
"See 3 Williston, Contracts (1920) sec. 1982, et seq.
It re Astoraga Paper Co. (1916, N. D. N. Y.) 234 Fed. 792; Loeser v. Alex-
ander (igio, C. C. A. 6th) 176 Fed. 265. "A surety or an indorser for the bank-
rupt, whose liability is contingent, cannot prove a claim of his own by reason of
such liability. It is only the creditor's claim which is provable." In re Astoraga
Paper Co., supra at p. 795.
' Thayer v. Daniels (1872) i1O Mass. 345; Sibley v. McAllister (1836) 8 N. H.
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theless those courts overlooked something. The proposition, that it is
not the debtor's duty to pursue his creditor with the money that is due,
has no affirmative aspects; and the debtor can never derive from it
any sort of collateral advantage.3 1 It is not difficult to apply this
thought to the instant problem. The surety should pay the debt, and
then prove his claim. If the debt is in dispute, the surety can protect
himself by vouching in the trustee in bankruptcy; if then there is an
adverse judgment, the trustee cannot dispute its validity3 2 ; and mean-
while, it is believed, the bankruptcy court would receive a proof of claim
by the surety although it necessarily is expressed to be contingent on
the event of the suit.3   Furthermore, the surety always has had it at
his option to compel the creditor to prove his claim against the princi-
pal's estate, so as to get, as contingent credits against his own account,
the dividends which the creditor would thus receive.34 Putting these
things together, the surety ought not to be allowed to hold the principal
after the latter's discharge. And to this conclusion the Supreme Court
has finally come, although not, it must be confessed, upon very satis-
factory reasoning. 5
'Thus the debtor cannot complain if the-creditor fails to foreclose a mortgage
promptly when due, even if his delay causes depreciation in the value of the
collateral. Lewis v. Blume (1917) 226 Mass. 5o5, 116 N. E. 271.
'See Severson v. Macomber (1914) 212 N. Y. 274, io6 N. E. 72; Hare v.
Grant (1877) 77 N. C. 203.
ISee i re Lyons Sugar Co. (1911, W. D. N. Y.) 192 Fed. 445. This would
seem to follow from the principle established in such cases as in re Sampter
(19o9, C. C. A. 2d) i7o Fed. 938; In re Baker Notion Co. (191o, S. D. N. Y.)
18o Fed. 9= (secured creditor can and must file temporary proof pending the
liquidation of his claim by foreclosure of the lien); Page v. Rogers (i9o9) 211
U. S. 575, 29 Sup. Ct 159; Keppel v. Tifin Bank (195o) 197 U. S. 356, 25 Sup.
Ct. 443 (creditor with unlawful preference may prove claim after final judgment
setting aside the preferential transfer).
"This is "settled law," to use the words of both Lord Eldon [Ex parte Rush-
forth (i8o5, Ch.) io Ves. 409] and Chancellor Kent, Hayes v. Ward (i8ig, N. Y.)
4 Johns. Ch. 123. "It is now settled that a surety may require the creditor, upon
a proper indemnity, to go and prove his bond under a commission of bankruptcy
of the principal debtor; and the creditor will be a trustee for the dividends to
the surety paying the whole." Hayes v. Ward, supra at p. 132, and cases there
cited. This balances the proposition that, while the surety could not prove unless
he paid off the whole debt, yet the creditor, while entitled to prove for the whole
without crediting part payments by the surety [Re Souther (1874, D. Mass.) 2
Low. 320], held any surplus thus realized in trust for the surety. In re Baxter
(1878) 18 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 497.
"1 Williams v. U. S. .Fid. etc. Co. (1915) 236 U. S. 549, 35 Sup. Ct. 289. The
court cited Mace v Wells (1849, U. S.) 7 How. 272; accord, Tobias v. Rogers
(1855) 13 N. Y. 59. Those cases were decided under the Act of 1841, which
allowed proof of contingent claims. As the surety, under such a statute, could
prove against the principal's estate without paying the creditor, naturally the
principal's discharge barred any claim for reimbursement. Such cases have no
bearing under our present Act, which allows no such proof by the surety.
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What about a claim that has not matured? It certainly is not the
duty of any kind of debtor to pay before the debt becomes due. It has
been held, however, that a surety, if he pays a debt before it is due, is
entitled to reimbursement at the due date provided he can show that
nothing meanwhile could have happened that would have relieved both
the principal and himself from the obligation of paying at all.3 6 That
is logical enough, when the principal is master of his own affairs. But
when he goes into bankruptcy his creditors share in a limited fund, and
it is of importance to each creditor that no one else be allowed to prove
for more than is justly due. It follows that no surety can acquire for
himself a provable claim by paying an unmatured debt unless the bank-
ruptcy itself accelerates the maturity. That happens with certain sorts
of claims 37 ; and in any such case the surety's position is just as it would
be with a claim that had matured prior to the bankruptcy. But in no
other case should the surety be allowed to pay and then prove; the
rights of the real creditors to an undisturbed distribution of the bank-
rupt's estate, dedicated to that purpose by the bankruptcy, forbid the
very thought of such a thing. The surety and his principal should be
left where they were, to handle the claim when it should mature, just as
if there had been no bankruptcy, and no discharge. The debt not being
provable, the principal cannot plead his discharge against it; and, by the
same token, the discharge would not be available against the surety in
case he should be compelled to pay in the first instance.3 8
So much for the ordinary bearings of bankruptcy upon the surety's
right of reimbursement. All the results traced in the preceding para-
graphs have flowed from one central idea, that bankruptcy never
destroys a debt. The bankrupt is discharged from his provable debts,
but the discharge is merely a personal defence, which he can waive if
he so pleases; and his waiver, in the given instance, leaves the old debt
" Guekeitheimer v. Kahn (1914) 243 Pa. 75, 89 AtI. 807; Hotham v. Berry
(igio) 82 Kan. 412, io8 Pac. Soi; contra, Ladd v. Chamber of Commerce (i0oo)
37 Or. 49, 6o Pac. 713, 62 Pac. 2o8.
" See authorities cited supra note 28; also Central Trust Co. v. Chi. Audi-
torium (1916) 240 U. S. 581, 36 Sup. Ct. 412, establishing the rule that bank-
ruptcy operates as an anticipatory breach of contract. Of course, the doctrine of
anticipatory breach does not apply to every sort of contract. See Glenn, Proof
of Uinatured Claims in Bankruptcy (igio) IO CoL L. Rv. 709, et seq.
" See Moch v. Market St. Bank (19O1, C. C. A. d) iO7 Fed. 897; Leader v.
Mattingly (1904) 14o Ala. 444, 37 So. 270. In re Baker (915, E. D. N. C.) 224
Fed. 611, where a surety on a lease which had several years to run was allowed
to prove for rent not yet accrued, is undoubtedly wrong, because the rent was not
accelerated by the bankruptcy. See supra note 37. This conclusion is by no
means affected by the rule which so construes the statute as to allow the surety
who has paid the debt to prove, although the debt became due after the filing of
the petition, provided proof is made within the time limit set by the statute.
Moch v. Market St. Bank, supra; In re Semmer Glass Co. (19o5, C. C. A. 2d)
135 Fed. 77.
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in full force and vigor. Bankruptcy simply plays upon the enforceabil-
ity of obligations, but none of them does it cancel. Nor can this result
be obviated by contract. A stipulation that a debt shall not be proven
in bankruptcy is of the same class as a provision that no suit shall be
brought on a contract. If given its proper weight such a stipulation
simply means that there is no intention to create a debt; the beneficiary
is no creditor, as we know that term. 9
But it is not necessarily the same with the surety's obligation. In one
sense his contract follows that which the principal makes; in general,
he must answer for the principal's breach. But the surety's obligation
need.not be as broad as that of his principal; and it is conceivable that
one may undertake to respond for another's default only to a certain
degree. It is quite possible, therefore, to conceive of a principal going
into bankruptcy without the surety becoming liable, because of the way
in which the surety has framed his undertaking. And there are such
cases in reality,-two classes of them, in fact.
In the first place there is the well-known rule of adoption. A bank-
ruptcy trustee can, if he so elects, adopt an outstanding contract of the
bankrupt. If he does so the bankrupt is relieved from further liability,
and the contract becomes one with the trustee.40 In that event it would
seem clear that the surety is relieved from further responsibility. He
bound himself for his principal's performance, not for that of a sub-
stitute; and hence the substitution of the trustee for the principal sim-
ply ends the matter so far as the surety is concerned.
In that sort of case the discharge of the surety flows, not from the
adjudication in and of itself, but from the subsequent act of the trustee
in adopting the contract which the surety had underwritten. But there
is another class of cases where the bankruptcy, if it is to have any
effect upon the surety's obligation, operates of its own force without
the aid of ensuing acts on the part of anybody. This situation is pre-
sented by certain kinds of "court bonds"-the ones in question being
supersedeas bonds, and bonds to relieve attachments. And once more
we are led into fields of the law which lie outside of suretyship.
The supersedeas bond is given where the defendant in an action
desires, not only to appeal from the judgment in which he has been cast,
but also to stay the issuance of execution pending the decision of the
appeal. The condition of such a bond therefore is the prosecution of
the appeal to effect, and the payment of the judgment in case it is
affirmed. The bond to relieve an attachment is a -little more compli-
cated. Originally its primary object was to compel the appearance of
' See Burt v. Rattle (1876) 31 Ohio St. 116; Cass v. Realty Co. (911) 148
App. Div. 96, 132 N. Y. Supp. lO74, aff'd. (1912) 206 N. Y. 649, 99 N. E. 11o5;
It re Fechhe-nzer (1914, C. C. A. 2d) 212 Fed. 357.
'Dayton. Co. v. Felsemthal (19o2, C. C. A. 6th) 116 Fed. 961; In re Wisetnan(19o8, E. D. Pa.) 159 Fed. 236; Hanna v. Iron Co. (1918) 222 N. Y. 29o, 118
N. E. 629.
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the defendant in the action, and therefore no defence.could be put in
unless the bond was given; such was the custom of London, and such
is still the rule in a few of our states.4 1 But modern statutes seek for
more than that. Their object is not so much to compel an appearance
as to give the plaintiff security for such judgment as he may finally
obtain in the action 42 and consequently the giving of a bond is not Peces-
sary to the defence of the suit if the defendant chooses to leave the
property under the attachment. writ.43  There is also, among the states,
a difference in the tenor of the bonds sanctioned; the difference lying
in whether the bond takes the place of the attachment lien or is a sub-
stitute merely for the property attached. In both cases the extent of
the obligation is the same: it represents the value of the property
attached. The bond to discharge an attachment runs directly to the
plaintiff and binds the payment of the judgment pro tanto; but the
other sort of bond, the "forthcoming bond," has as obligee the officer
who has executed the writ, and requires payment to him in case the
plaintiff recovers in his suit. Theoretically speaking, in the first case
"'By the custom (of London, the source of the attachment) a defendant
could not appear or raise an issue about the debt claimed without entering special
bail, or else surrendering his body." Ownbey v. Morgan (1921) 41 Sup. Ct. 433.
James, L. J., says: "It is clear that foreign attachment is in its substance, origin,
and intention a process to compel appearance ..... If the debtor fails to appear
he is considered to have admitted that the debt claimed was due to the extent of
the money in the hands of the garnishee. If the debtor appears-but only in this
event, and in case nothing is done in the meantime-and renders himself up, the
process is at an end, and the plaintiff has no more claim upon the moneys
attached." Levy v. Lovell (i88o) L. R. i4 Ch. Div. 234, 238.
"Foreign attachment is but a process by which to commence a personal action.
It seizes property to compel an appearance. It can be dissolved upon entering
bail, and when dissolved, (he judgment against the defendant is it; personamn!"
Albany Ins. Co. v. Whitney (1871) 70 Pa. 248, 252.
"The process of attachment, as it existed under the common law, differed in
its nature and object from the provisional remedy now known by that name. Its
original purpose was to acquire jurisdiction of the defendant by compelling him
to appear in court through the seizure of his property, which he forfeited if he
did not appear, or furnish sureties for his appearance ..... It was part of the
service of process in a civil action through a species of distress, in which the
goods attached were the ancient vadii or pledges ..... Its present purpose is
not to compel appearance by the debtor, but to secure the debt or claim of the
creditor. It is a proceeding in rem, and the process may issue, in certain cases,
whether the defendant has been served with a summons or not, although inability
to serve, through the fault of the defendant, is a ground upon which the warrant
may be granted. It exists, as a provisional remedy, only when authorized by
statute, and, as such, is comparatively recent in its origin ..... It is not only
created by statute, but has substantially none of the features peculiar to the
common law remedy." Penoyar v. Kelsey (1896) I5O N. Y. 77, 79-8o, 44 N. E.
788.
"Pendente life, the statutes of Delaware, from whose courts Ownbey v. Mor-
gan, supra note 41, went to the Supreme Court, were amended to that effect.
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the bond is an entire substitute for the attachment, the latter disappear-
ing from legal contemplation; while the forthcoming bond, on the con-
trary, has place only as subordinate to the attachment, which is still of
force.4" But no matter which sort of bond is required in the particularjurisdiction, at least one consequence is inevitable,-the property pre-
viously attached is no longer subject to the plaintiff's lien. It is thefree property of the debtor, and if he becomes bankrupt, it constitutes
part of his estate. In ultimate effect, therefore, any such bond, super-
sedeas, forthcoming, or in discharge of attachment, comes to this, that
the surety on it is bound in form to respond either to the plaintiff, or to
the levying officer for his use, in case judgment is recovered or affirmed
as the case may be. Such a bond constitutes the plaintiff's only specific
recourse. He may, of course, prove in the bankruptcy, but naturally
he will be more interested in the bond. In any such case does the
principal's bankruptcy afford the surety any defence?
The decisions are at variance. The English courts held that the
principal's discharge in bankruptcy pending an appeal did not release
the sureties on a supersedeas bond, and this decision was followed in
New York.45  In Georgia an opposite result was reached.46  As to
attachment bonds, there is likewise a difference of opinion. Under the
Bankruptcy Act of 1867 the Supreme Court had before it a case, arising
in a state court, of a bond given to release an attachment. Pending this
suit, the principal was adjudged bankrupt and then received his dis-
charge. Thereafter the attaching plaintiff won his suit and the state
court, agreeably to its practice, entered judgment against both the
principal and the sureties on the bond. The Supreme Court held that
the judgment should be perpetually stayed as to the principal, but not
as to the sureties, saying that "they were bound not to pay any judg-
ment which might be rendered against him, but to pay the debt he had
agreed to pay in a certain event, which had happened. ' ' 47 Some of our
state courts have reached the same result, under both the Act of 1867
and the present law.48  In other jurisdictions a contrary result was
reached under the older statute, and also under the present Bankruptcy
Act.49 In Connecticut a distinction has been drawn between a "forth-
" Schunack v. Art Metal Co., supra note 23; U. S. Engine Co. v. North Penn.
Co., supra note 23.45Southcote v. Braithwaite (1787, K. B.) i T. R. 624; Hall v. Fowler (1844,N. Y.) 6 Hill, 630; Knapp v. Anderson (1877) 71 N. Y. 466.
'Odell v. Wootten (1868) 38 Ga. 224. W olf v. Stix (1878) 99 U. S. I, 9.43Macombs v. Allen (i88o) 82 N. Y. 114; King v. Block Amusement Co. (1908)126 App. Div. 48, 111 N. Y. Supp. 102, aff'd. (igo8) 193 N. Y. 6o8, 86 N. E. 1126;In re Federal Biscuit Co. (1914,. C. C. A. 2d) 214 Fed. 221; Schunack v. Art
Metal Co., U. S. Engine v. North Penn. Co., and Butterick Pub. Co. v. Bowen Co.,
supra note 23.
" Crook Horner Co. v. Gilpin (191o) 112 Md. 1, 75 Atl. 1O49; Windisch, &c.Co. v. Simms (1911) 129 La. 134, 55 So. 739; Klipstein v. Allen-Miles Co. (19o5,
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coming" bond, which merely substitutes itself for the property attached,
but leaves the attachment in legal effect, and a bond which is intcnded
to be taken in lieu of the attachment. In the latter case, the court
says,5" "the attachment is regarded as not only non-existent, after the
adjudication in bankruptcy, but as being an event of the past possessing
no manner of significance in the present." But in the case of a forth-
coming bond there is "such a relation between the bond and the attach-
ment by virtue of the office of the former under the statute, and of its
compulsory substitution for the attachment by the operation of the
machinery of the law, set in motion as a statutory incident of the
attachment, as to entitle the bond to be regarded in'the eye of the law
as dependent for its life and efficiency upon the continuance of the
attachment."
The cause of this conflict of opinion is quite apparent. The effort
of the courts was to fit together ideas which had originated in alien
sources. The courts had to consider several things in their relation to
each other; the subjects presented including the nature of a judgment,
and the bearing thereon of bankruptcy, and these things together as
defining the meaning of the bond which had been given. Let us now
attempt the same task.
Obviously the first question is, how does bankruptcy affect a judg-
ment? Fundamentally the court takes the debtor's estate as he left it,
and subject to all outstanding liens, except such as constituted the
means of working a fraudulent or a preferential transfer. But, ohce
the bankruptcy court took an estate into its custody, the statutes always
forbade the obtaining of further liens. It followed that, if a judgment
was obtained prior to the bankruptcy, it was good as a lien on real
estate wherever state laws so provided; if an execution had been levied
the plaintiff could proceed to judgment and sale; and if an attachment
bad been procured the creditor could proceed to judgment, being lim-
ited, however, to a realization only out of the attached property.51 But
beyond that the judgment, levy, or attachment had no effect. As to
any deficiency, between the amount realized out of the property thus
specifically taken in charge prior to the bankruptcy and the total amount
of the debt, the creditor was simpl a general creditor, his judgment
being useful only as proof of his debt.52  Such was the general effect of
C. C. A. 5th) 136 Fed. 385; Carpenter v. Turrell (1868) IOO Mass. 45o. The
same result was reached in Michigan, where the bond was to discharge a capias.
Bryant v. Kinyon (i9oi) 127 Mich. 152, 86 N. W. 531.
' Schunack v. Art Metal Co. (911) 84 Conn. 331, 336, 8o At!. 29o, 293.
'Peck v. Jenness (1849, U. S.) 7 How. 612; Doe v. Childress (1874, U. S.)
21 Wall. 642; Butterick Pub. Co. v. Bowe, Co., supra note 23; Oldfields Syndi-
cate v. Am. Imp. Co. (1919, C. C. A. 9th) 26o Fed. 9o5; see also Hill v. Harding,
supra note 27, Wolf v. Stix, supra note 47.
See Barry v. N. Y. Holding Co., supra note 21; Oldfield Syndicate v. Am.
Imp. Co. supra note 51.
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the bankruptcy laws of former times. With the progress of legislation,
however, complications have arisen. The National Act of 1867 (sec.
14) invalidated all attachments and levies obtained during the period
intervening between the filing of the bankruptcy petition and the adjudi-
cation. By a much more extensive ex post facto process the present
National Bankrupt Act (sec. 67) invalidates "all levies, judgments,
attachments, or other liens obtained through judicial proceedings"
against the bankrupt "at any time within four months prior to the
filing of a petition in bankruptcy against him." It is true that there is
a proviso in favor of a bona fide purchaser at an execution sale held
prior to the bankruptcy. But that does not avail the judgment creditor
or attaching creditor, as the case may be, because, while the trustee
cannot get back the property from the purchaser, he is entitled to claim
the proceeds of sale if still in the sheriff's hands"3 or if too late for that,
to recover it from the judgment creditor in an action for money had
and received.5 4
The play of this legislation, upon the court bonds in which we are
interested, may easily be seen if we ascertain what the obligee of any
such bond really desired. The answer is easy; what he wanted was
a judgment. But a judgment is of a double nature. First is its aspect
of res judicata; it determines whether anything is due, and how much.
Second, it gives the creditor the right to realize his debt out of the
debtor's property. The attachment fits in with this latter aspect of the
judgment by taking into custody meanwhile the attached assets, so that
out of them at least the creditor will have a prior right of realization
when he gets his judgment. And it is quite obvious that the judgment
is desired, not as res judicata, but as a means of realizing the debt.
It is inconceivable, indeed, that a creditor should seek a judgment which
should not carry'with it the power of realization. For this power, in
the words of the Supreme Court, is "a part, and an essential part, of
every judgment passed by a court exercising judicial power. It is no
judgment, in the legal sense of the term, without it."55
This, it is submitted, gives the answer to the problem on which the
courts have so radically differed. The surety underwrites a bond
which is intended in the words ot the Massachusetts court, to be the
equivalent of "a judgment valid against the principal and which he is
bound to pay"56 If, because of the intervention of bankruptcy and his
"Clarke v. Larremore (1903) I88 U. S. 486, 23 Sup. Ct. 363.
"In re Weitzel (1911, E. D. N. Y.) 191 Fed. 463; Dreyer v. Kicklighter (1916,
S. D. Ga.) 228 Fed. 744; It re Breslauer (19o3, N. D. N. Y.) 121 Fed. 9io.
'South Dakota v. North Carolina (19o4) 192 U. S. 286, 24 Sup. Ct. 269. The
creditor's "common natural right is to collect his debt by subjecting his debtor to
due process of law in any jurisdiction where he may find him." Netograph Mfg.
Co. v. Scrugham (igio) 197 N. Y. 377, 380, go N. E. 962, 963.
Carpenter v. Turrell, supra, note 49, at p. 453.
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discharge, the principal is not "bound to pay" the judgment, then the
bond should not be considered effective. The question in each case
should be whether the bankruptcy has left the judgment, or the attach-
ment as the case may be, valid as a subsisting lien on anything at all.
If so, then the bond should be made to respond, but otherwise not.
For, when the effect of bankruptcy in the particular case is to deprive
the judgment or attachment of any capacity of lien or levy, then in
principle the case would seem no different from that of a bond given in
discharge of an attachment issued against the property of a defendant
who is by statute exempt from the writ. Such a bond is not action-
able, because "there was no lawful attachment and therefore no lawful
authority for taking any bond whatever"57  Bankruptcy, when it does
destroy the lien of a judgment or attachment, operates in exactly the
same way; the lien is destroyed by statute, and there would seem to be
no difference between destroying a lien ex post facto and forbidding
its creation at the outset.
Whatever may be one's thought on this particular topic, however, no
conclusive answer can be expected from judicial sources, conclusive,
that is, in the sense of settling the law for all parts of this country.
There can be no such answer because the question-is not "federal,"-
unless the courts should change their minds in this regard,-and there-
fore the views even of the Supreme Court are but persuasive so far as
state courts may be concerned. 8
But it does not matter much. Our law would lose half of its charm
if it did not have its open questions, and for the student the task is
not so much to answer a question as to realize how it has arisen. Any
such endeavor will justify itself if in the course of it should come
renewed appreciation of the nature of our law as an organic whole, and
not as a collection of separate subjects of thought. The composition
has artistic effect, but nevertheless it is a composition.
' Pac. Bank v. Mixter (1888) 124 U. S. 721, 729, 8 Sup. Ct. 718, 722 (attachment
against property of a national bank).
'In re Federal Biscuit Co. (1914, C. C. A. 2d) 214 Fed. 221; In re Mercedes
Import Co. (19o8, C. C. A. 2d) 166 Fed. 427; Int re Rosenthal (igoi, S. D. N. Y.)
io8 Fed. 368; It re Maaget (19o9, S. D. N. Y.) 173 Fed. 232; In re Squier (19o8,
E. D. N. Y.) 165 Fed. 515. Wolf v. Stix, supra note 47, and Klipstein v. Allen-
Miles Co., supra note 49, must be taken in that light. The court's jurisdiction in
the latter case was based on diversity of citizenship; and in Wolf v. Stix the
Supreme Court's jurisdiction to review the state court's judgment was based on
quite a different federal question. See supra note 21.
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